IRGC Undersea Cable Threat: Can Hormuz Cuts Disrupt Internet?

Summary

The Revolutionary Guards’ undersea cable threat in the Strait of Hormuz would have limited reach, according to cable data and one technology expert. The waterway carries less than one percent of international bandwidth, so damage would hit Gulf connectivity harder than the global internet, Iran International reports.

Key Highlights

• Yadollah Javani, the IRGC’s political deputy, warned on 21 October that Hormuz cables could be targeted if Iranian infrastructure came under attack.
• The ICPC counts five active cable segments through the strait, under one percent of international bandwidth.
• TeleGeography names AAE-1, FALCON and Gulf Bridge International as the main systems.
• Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE could face disruption, though all four have terrestrial backups.

What Happened?

Javani issued the warning on Friday, 29 October. The strait’s weight in oil and gas shipping might suggest similar weight for internet traffic, but the data says otherwise. The main routes linking Europe and East Asia run through the Red Sea. TeleGeography says the Hormuz cables are routed through Omani waters because of long-running political difficulties with Iran.

Why is it Important?

The global internet does not rely on one network or point of failure. Operators use several submarine and terrestrial routes and can redirect traffic when one fails. Rerouting can slow speeds, raise latency, or disrupt some services, but it does not automatically cut users off. A damaged cable is not the same as a country losing access.

Impact and Implications

The Hormuz cables mainly serve Gulf countries, so regional connectivity is most exposed. Saudi Arabia depends less on them, since most of its bandwidth lands on the Red Sea coast. Mehdi Saremifar, a Canada-based technology expert, told Iran International that earlier threats were largely rhetorical because the calculations used global cable traffic, not the smaller Hormuz share. He called it “neither a particularly far-reaching threat nor a particularly serious one,” though evidence of naval movements toward the cables would change his view.

Recent cases support the point. Three Red Sea cables were damaged in February 2024, and repairs took six months, according to TeleGeography. Damage to four cables off West Africa in March 2024 disrupted services in 13 countries, per the Internet Society, yet operators rerouted some traffic.

What Happens Next?

Security risks might slow down the repairs by stopping boats from getting in. Still other paths mean the delay might not cause a time without service in the area.